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Indonesia are influenced by the educational characteristics of their CEOs and CFOs. This study uses 368 
observations from 150 listed companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the period 2010 to 2015. 
We find that CEOs with higher educational levels invest more in research and development. This is 
consistent with more education instilling a longer-term perspective on corporate managers. We also find 
that CFOs with accounting certifications invest less in R&D, consistent with the risk-adverse nature of the 
accounting profession. For companies and shareholders, our findings indicate the need for a greater 
understanding of the factors associated with R&D investments in Indonesia and other developing 
markets. Particularly, factors related to the background experience of CEOs and other executives, whose 
characteristics can have a real impact on the R&D investment decisions of firms. Our results show that 
the education of CEOs and CFOs is associated with their investment decisions in research and 
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Indonesian firms. 
Keywords 
CFO, CEO, Education, R&D Investment, Indonesia 
Cover Page Footnote 
This project has received funding from the Faculty of Economics and Business, Universitas Airlangga, in 
2017 
This article is available in Australasian Accounting, Business and Finance Journal: https://ro.uow.edu.au/aabfj/vol14/
iss2/3 
CEO & CFO Education and 




Iman Harymawan1, Mohammad Nasih2, Dian Agustia3, Melinda Cahyaning Ratri4 





This study examines how the research and development (R&D) investments of listed companies in 
Indonesia are influenced by the educational characteristics of their CEOs and CFOs. This study uses 368 
observations from 150 listed companies on the Indonesian Stock Exchange for the period 2010 to 2015. 
We find that CEOs with higher educational levels invest more in research and development. This is 
consistent with more education instilling a longer-term perspective on corporate managers. We also find 
that CFOs with accounting certifications invest less in R&D, consistent with the risk-adverse nature of the 
accounting profession. For companies and shareholders, our findings indicate the need for a greater 
understanding of the factors associated with R&D investments in Indonesia and other developing markets. 
Particularly, factors related to the background experience of CEOs and other executives, whose 
characteristics can have a real impact on the R&D investment decisions of firms. Our results show that the 
education of CEOs and CFOs is associated with their investment decisions in research and development. 
Thus, different education backgrounds create a bias for or against R&D investment in Indonesian firms.6 
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Indonesia is the fourth most populous nation in the world and the 16th largest economy, yet is 
ranked only 105th in terms of research and development (R&D) spending by the Global Innovation 
Index.7 R&D spending as a share of GDP in Indonesia is less than 0.1%, compared to 1.26% in 
Malaysia and 2.19% in Singapore. In recent years, the government of Indonesia has developed a 
Master Plan of National Research (RIRN 2017-2045) to strengthen the national research sector 
and increase the contribution of research to national economic growth. The goal is to increase 
R&D investment to 1% of GDP, with significant increases expected in both public and private 
funding of R&D activities. In this study, we examine the investments that listed companies are 
making in R&D in Indonesia and how the characteristics of CEOs and CFOs influence R&D 
investment decisions.   
 
A company is established in order to succeed in both the short and long term. To meet both of 
these needs, companies have to make continuous innovations and create competitive advantages 
(Bayus et al. 2003; Calantone et al. 2006; Pauwels et al. 2004). One of the innovations companies 
can make to gain more profit in the future is to invest in research and development activities. R&D 
investment can be considered as investment in new technology and knowledge, which can then be 
transformed into more efficient production methods for available resources (Tuna et al. 2015). 
R&D aims to create a new product or develop an existing product in order to attract consumers, 
resulting in an increase in the number of consumers and their loyalty to the company, and 
ultimately will have an impact on increasing profit for the company. R&D is an important strategic 
decision for the company as it can help the company improve its competitiveness and innovation 
capability. 
 
The board of directors and the top management team are the core of corporate governance and 
play an important role in corporate decision making (Jensen & Murphy 1990; Simeon 2001). The 
two top executives who play the most important role in corporate decision-making are the Chief 
Executive Officer (CEO) and Chief Financial Officer (CFO). The CEO is the senior manager who 
is responsible for overseeing the activities of the entire company. While the CFO is the senior 
manager who is responsible for overseeing the financial activities of the company. Furthermore, 
CEOs often make decisions about major investing and financing within the company, which 
requires the approval of the board (Ganor 2011). In this case, the CFO contributes to CEO 
considerations that may influence the decision. Academic studies report that CFOs often collect 
the necessary data, perform financial analysis and provide recommendations to the CEO in making 
decisions. As a result, the decisions taken may reflect some of the characteristics of both the CEO 
and CFO (Barker & Mueller 2002; Malmendier & Tate 2005; Campello et al. 2010; Graham & 
Harvey 2001; Johnson 2015). 
 
R&D investment is one of the most fundamental investment decisions made by top managers of 
companies (Barker & Mueller 2002). Therefore, the characteristics of CEOs and CFOs are very 
influential in determining the company’s efforts to innovate. Hambrick and Mason (1984) suggest 
that visible personal traits of top executives could be used to infer their basic beliefs and values 
and that these conviction systems could influence firm-level strategic decisions. More specifically, 
                                                                
7 https://oxfordbusinessgroup.com/news/indonesia-seeking-greater-funding-rd 
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resource dependency theory implies that the personal attributes of CEOs and directors can 
influence a company’s R&D investment (Barker & Mueller 2002; Cazier 2011; Lin et al. 2011).  
 
One of the prominent individual characteristics of executives to consider is education, because it 
is closely related to innovation. R&D projects are usually risky and expensive, so it is important 
for CEOs and CFOs to have stronger insights and higher cognitive skills. Thus, education is one 
of the important factors in innovation decisions. Previous studies have discussed the impact of 
executive education on decisions related to R&D investment. These studies have concluded that a 
higher manager education level is correlated with stronger innovation and managerial capabilities 
(Lin et al. 2011), capability to adapt and learn new technology (Dalziel et al. 2011), capability to 
gather, handle and analyze information (Escriba et al. 2009) and capability to solve problems 
caused by R&D issues (Balkin et al. 2000; Wincent et al. 2010). Therefore, a firm whose CEO has 
a higher education level is expected to invest more in R&D.  
 
In addition, managers’ professional backgrounds also influence their view of innovation. Barker 
and Mueller (2002) argue that CEOs’ professional experience in various functions is also important 
in corporate R&D decisions, as their perceptions of new technology will be biased by their 
professional experience. Koo (2019) states that CEOs with strong firm-specific human capital have 
a significant long-term influence on firm innovation. For example, executives with career 
experience in R&D/engineering and marketing/sales will favour innovative strategies because 
these business functions emphasize growth through discovering new products and markets.  
 
In contrast, CEOs and CFOs with career experience in accounting and finance tend to work at 
improving the efficiency of the organization and to avoid uncertainty and risk (Finkelstein & 
Hambrick 1996; Helliar et al. 2002). For example, Matsunaga and Yeung (2008) find that firms 
managed by former CFOs tend to have more accrual-based income that indicates the use of more 
conservative accounting policies. Aier et al. (2005) show that CFOs with advanced degrees and 
CPA certifications are more conservative in their accounting choices and therefore have fewer 
earnings restatements. Thus, CEOs and CFOs with an accounting background are expected to be 
associated with more conservative corporate decisions, such as investing less in long-term and 
risky projects.  
 
This study examines how the education of CEOs and CFOs affect firm decisions on research and 
development investments in Indonesia, a nation where R&D is of growing importance. This study 
uses 368 firm-year observations from companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange for the 
period from 2010 to 2015. We find that CEOs with higher educational levels invest more in 
research and development. This is consistent with more education instilling a longer-term 
perspective on corporate managers. We also find that CFOs with accounting certifications invest 
less in R&D, consistent with the conservative, risk-adverse nature of the accounting profession. 
The results suggest that companies in Indonesia need to improve their board's understanding of 
factors related to R&D investment in order to maintain their long-term company sustainability. 
 
Newness of the Study 
 
This study makes three contributions to the growing literature on R&D investment. First, in 
contrast to previous research, which focuses on the characteristics of CEOs, this study also takes 
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the characteristics of the CFO into account. Thus, we examine the impact of both CEO and CFO 
characteristics in shaping firm-level R&D investments. Second, prior studies have focused on the 
relationship between R&D activities and the technical backgrounds of executives from the 
perspective of science/engineering/innovation experience. We investigate the relationship between 
accounting certifications and R&D activities, as we believe the accounting profession promotes 
risk aversion, which is expected to be associated with less investment in risky R&D activities.8 
Third, the majority of prior literature examines R&D issues in developed markets. A number of 
recent studies have examined R&D investment in China, but there is still limited research on R&D 
activities in other developing markets. This study therefore adds to the investigation of factors 




Based on upper-echelons theory, this paper proposes that firm-level R&D investment varies with 
the characteristics of top executives, while controlling for other firm-level factors (Hambrick & 
Mason 1984; Barker & Mueller 2002; Hambrick 2007). We assume that R&D investment is a 
decision under the control of top executives, and due to its risky nature we expect that CEOs and 
CFOs actively monitor R&D investments and adjust the level of R&D activities based on their 
preferences. We acknowledge that CEOs have the greatest organizational power to influence R&D 
investments (Zahra & Pearce 1989), but also consider the role that CFOs play in monitoring and 
advising the CEO about R&D activities. Consistent with prior studies utilizing upper-echelons 
theory, we propose that the education level and background expertise of top executives is related 




The CEO is an executive who not only acts as a decision maker but also the executor, so that the 
CEO’s cognitive, values and insights, influenced by CEO characteristics, such as educational and 
professional background, are key factors influencing organizational strategy (Hambrick & Mason 
1984). CFOs are financial managers of companies whose responsibilities include overseeing 
financial reporting, managing internal controls and ensuring compliance with accounting rules. 
However, CEOs and CFOs are two interconnected parties. The contribution of CFOs to CEO 
considerations can influence major corporate decisions (Campello et al. 2010; Graham & Harvey 
2001; Johnson 2015).  
 
Upper-echelons theory states that innovation strategies are influenced by the personal 
characteristics of top managers, such as education level and professional background (Barker & 
Mueller 2002; Daellenbach et al. 1999). Prior research has concluded that a higher level of CEO 
education is correlated with stronger innovation and managerial skills (Lin et al. 2011), ability to 
adapt and learn new technologies (Dalziel et al. 2011), the ability to collect, handle and analyze 
information (Escriba et al. 2009) and ability to solve problems caused by R&D problems (Balkin 
et al. 2000; Wincent et al. 2010). Lin et al. (2011) indicates that the educational level of CEOs, 
professional backgrounds and political connections is positively associated with innovation 
                                                                
8 This study also complements recent work on the role accountants play in business activities in Indonesia (Gaffikin 
and Lindawati 2012; Lindawati and Smark 2015).  
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efforts. Wen & Hu (2009) find that the level of education and professional experience of CEOs is 
significantly positively related to R&D expenditures in China.  
 
R&D activities are usually associated with new technologies and new products. Higher educated 
executives tend to have greater cognitive density to assimilate new ideas, thereby increasing the 
likelihood of R&D investment (Barker & Mueller 2002). Education is positively associated with 
cognitive abilities (Finkelstein & Hambrick 1996) and higher-educated managers are better able 
to generate new and creative solutions to problems (Bantel & Jackson 1989). Education can help 
to broaden horizons, improve the quality and way of thinking, and increase insight. CEOs and 
CFOs with different levels of education have different values, abilities and insights. Because R&D 
projects are highly risky, CEOs and CFOs need to have stronger insights, higher cognitive abilities 
and a longer term perspective. Based on this, we propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1. CEOs and CFOs with higher educational levels invest more in research and 
development. 
 
The backgrounds of CFOs and CEOs should also be important in their acceptance of innovative 
ideas and activities, because professional experiences can influence organizational decisions. Tyler 
and Kevin (1995) find that CEOs with technical work experience, such as R&D/engineering, are 
consistent with progress, discovery and improvement in the high-tech sector. Conversely, a CEO 
with career experience in accounting/finance, administration and law functions will improve 
organizational efficiency (Finkelstein & Hambrick 1996). Matsunaga and Yeung (2008) find that 
firms managed by former CFOs tend to have more accrual-based income that indicates the use of 
more conservative accounting policies. Aier et al. (2005) show that CFOs with advanced degrees 
and CPA certifications produce better quality financial reports and less earnings restatements. 
 
Accounting careers and related experience in finance may affect the performance of CFOs and 
CEOs. Extensive accounting knowledge can help with financial reporting. Equally important, 
training and experience in accounting also tend to shape the CEO and CFO’s attitude toward risk 
and decisions when faced with uncertainty. Accounting training and standards are often written in 
conservative terms and favour risk aversion (Brief 1975). Consistent with this view, previous 
research has found that CPAs are usually risk averse and that accounting managers are more risk 
averse than other managers (Newton 1977; Helliar et al. 2002; Aier et al. 2005). To summarize, 
previous research has shown that executives with accounting backgrounds tend to be more risk 
averse in their decision-making. Based on these findings, we propose that CEOs and CFOs with 
accounting certifications will also exhibit higher levels of risk aversion when performing 
responsibilities beyond financial reporting. Their preference for risk avoidance is expected to 
manifest itself in lower R&D investment. Thus, we propose the following hypothesis: 
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The initial sample consists of all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (BEI) for the 
period 2010-2015. Sources of data in this study include company annual reports and the ORBIS 
database. Financial data was obtained from the ORBIS database. Data about CEOs (generally 
called President Directors in Indonesia) and CFOs (generally called Finance Directors in 
Indonesia), including their education level and professional certifications, and data for corporate 
governance variables, were obtained from company annual reports. These datasets were merged 
and the following sample selection criteria were applied. First, all companies from the finance, 
insurance and real estate industries (SIC 6) were excluded because of the different nature of their 
financial statements. Second, any observations without complete data were excluded from the 





The variables of interest in this study include the education level of the CEO (EDUCATION-CEO) 
and CFO (EDUCATION-CFO). This is measured using a highest-level education variable, 0 for 
CEOs/CFOs who have a Diploma, 1 for CEOs/CFOs who have a Bachelor degree, 2 for 
CEOs/CFOs who have a Master degree, and 3 for CEOs/CFOs who have a Doctoral degree (Chen 
2014; Kouaib & Jarboui 2016; Kuo et al. 2017). Another variable of interest is the accounting 
certification of the CEO (ACCERTIFIED-CEO) and CFO (ACCERTIFIED-CFO). This is 
measured using a dummy variable, 1 for CEOs/CFOs who have an accounting certification (e.g. 
CPA) and 0 for CEOs/CFOs who don’t have an accounting certification.  
 
R&D investment (R&D) is the dependent variable and is measured by two proxies for R&D 
intensity, R&D expense divided by total sales (R&D/SALES) and the natural logarithm of R&D 
expense (Ln_R&D). If R&D expense is zero, Ln_R&D is set to zero. These R&D intensity 
variables have been the most widely used R&D measures (Cohen & Klepper 1996; Balkin et al. 
2000; Lee & O’Neill 2003; Coles et al., 2006; Aier et al. 2005). 
 
Referring to previous research (Lin et al. 2011; Hoitash et al. 2016; Dalziel et al. 2011; Chen 2014; 
Purkayastha et al. 2016; Faleye et al. 2018) the control variables used in this study include: gender 
of the CEO (GENDER-CEO), gender of the CFO (GENDER-CFO), board size (BOARDSIZE), 
percentage of independent commissioners (INDEPENDENT), number of internal commissioners 
(INTCOM), number of external commissioners (EXTCOM), firm age (FIRMAGE), firm size 
(FIRMSIZE), firm leverage (LEVERAGE), current ratio (CURRENT), return on assets (ROA), 
operating cash flow (OCF), and firm intangible assets (INTANGIBLE). See the Appendix for full 










This study uses an OLS regression model with fixed year and industry effects, and clustered 
standard errors (Petersen 2009). To test the hypotheses in this study, the following regression 
models are used. We expect the coefficients on EDUCATION-CEO and EDUCATION-CFO to 
be positive and ACCERTIFIED-CEO and ACCERTIFIED-CFO to be negative. 
𝑹&𝑫𝒊,𝒕  𝜷𝟎 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑫𝑼𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵 𝑪𝑬𝑶𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑬𝑹𝑻𝑰𝑭𝑰𝑬𝑫 𝑪𝑬𝑶𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟑𝑮𝑬𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑹 𝑪𝑬𝑶𝒊,𝒕
𝜷𝟒𝑩𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟓𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑷𝑬𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟔𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑪𝑶𝑴𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟕𝑬𝑿𝑻𝑪𝑶𝑴𝒊,𝒕
𝜷𝟖𝑭𝑰𝑹𝑴𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟗𝑭𝑰𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑳𝑬𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑪𝑼𝑹𝑹𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕
𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑶𝑪𝑭𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝑰𝑩𝑳𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕
𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑼𝑺𝑻𝑹𝒀𝒊,𝒕 𝜺𝒊,𝒕                                                                                                                         1  
𝑹&𝑫𝒊,𝒕  𝜷𝟎 𝜷𝟏𝑬𝑫𝑼𝑪𝑨𝑻𝑰𝑶𝑵 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟐𝑨𝑪𝑪𝑬𝑹𝑻𝑰𝑭𝑰𝑬𝑫 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟑𝑮𝑬𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑹 𝑪𝑭𝑶𝒊,𝒕
𝜷𝟒𝑩𝑶𝑨𝑹𝑫𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟓𝑰𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑷𝑬𝑵𝑫𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟔𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑪𝑶𝑴𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟕𝑬𝑿𝑻𝑪𝑶𝑴𝒊,𝒕
𝜷𝟖𝑭𝑰𝑹𝑴𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟗𝑭𝑰𝑹𝑴𝑺𝑰𝒁𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑳𝑬𝑽𝑬𝑹𝑨𝑮𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑪𝑼𝑹𝑹𝑬𝑵𝑻𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊,𝒕
𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑶𝑪𝑭𝒊,𝒕 𝜷𝟏𝟒𝑰𝑵𝑻𝑨𝑵𝑮𝑰𝑩𝑳𝑬𝒊,𝒕 𝒀𝑬𝑨𝑹𝒊,𝒕




Descriptive Statistics and Univariate Analysis  
 
Table 1 (below) contains the sample distribution by industry sector and CEO and CFO education. 
Panel A shows the distribution for the education level of the CEO. Out of a total of 368 
observations, the highest level of education for CEOs is a Diploma (24), Bachelor degree (160), 
Master degree (176) and Doctoral degree (8). The Total column shows that the distribution across 
industries ranges from a low of 16 observations in SIC 8 to a high of 99 observations in SIC 4. 
Panel B shows the distribution for the education level of the CFO. Out of a total of 368 
observations, the highest level of education for CFOs is a Diploma (19), Bachelor degree (200), 
Master degree (143) and Doctoral degree (6). In summary, the most common education level for 
CEOs is a Master degree and for CFOs is a Bachelor degree. 
 
Table 1: Firm Distribution by Industry and CEO & CFO Education 




Diploma % Bachelor % Master % Doctoral % 
(SIC 0) Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
5 21.74 15 65.22 3 13.04 0 0.00 23 100 
(SIC 1) Mining 2 3.17 20 31.75 40 63.49 1 1.59 63 100 
(SIC 2) Construction 
Industries 
5 6.25 44 55.00 31 38.75 0 0.00 80 100 
(SIC 3) Manufacturing 1 3.70 7 25.93 19 70.37 0 0.00 27 100 
(SIC 4) Transportation, 
Communications and 
Utilities 
4 4.04 39 39.39 51 51.52 5 5.05 99 100 
(SIC 5) Wholesale & 
Retail Trade 
4 11.11 14 38.89 16 44.44 2 5.56 36 100 
(SIC 7) Service 
Industries 
3 12.50 11 45.83 10 41.67 0 0.00 24 100 
(SIC 8) Health, Legal, 
and Educational 
Services and Consulting 
0 0.00 10 62.50 6 37.50 0 0.00 16 100 
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Diploma % Bachelor % Master % Doctoral % 
(SIC 0) Agriculture, 
Forestry and Fisheries 
2 8.70 15 65.22 6 26.09 0 0.00 23 100 
(SIC 1) Mining 5 7.94 23 36.51 32 50.79 3 4.76 63 100 
(SIC 2) Construction 
Industries 
3 3.75 51 63.75 25 31.25 1 1.25 80 100 
(SIC 3) Manufacturing 0 0.00 18 66.67 9 33.33 0 0.00 27 100 
(SIC 4) Transportation, 
Communications and 
Utilities 
4 4.04 55 55.56 40 40.40 0 0.00 99 100 
(SIC 5) Wholesale & 
Retail Trade 
3 8.33 23 63.89 10 27.78 0 0.00 36 100 
(SIC 7) Service 
Industries 
1 4.17 9 37.50 14 58.33 0 0.00 24 100 
(SIC 8) Health, Legal, 
and Educational 
Services and Consulting 
1 6.25 6 37.50 7 43.75 2 12.50 16 100 
Total 19 5.16 200 54.35 143 38.86 6 1.63 368 100 
Notes: This table shows the sample distribution of CEO and CFO Education based on industry characteristics of 368 companies listed on the 
IDX in 2010-2015. 
 
Table 2 (below) shows the descriptive statistics. The mean values for R&D/SALES and Ln_R&D 
are 0.283 and 0.703. The mean values for EDUCATION-CEO and EDUCATION-CFO are 1.457 
and 1.370. Of the firms, 1.1% have a CEO with an accounting accreditation and 7.1% have a CFO 
with an accounting accreditation. The proportion of companies with male CEOs is 90.2% and male 
CFOs is 76.6%. The average board size is 9.845 directors and commissioners. The average 
proportion of independent commissioners is 37.264%. The average number of the internal and 
external commissioners are 2.927 and 1.755. The average company has total assets of IDR 
978,316.016, leverage of 50.4%, current ratio of 94.5%, ROA of 0.047, operating cash flow of 
6.8% of total assets, and intangible assets of IDR 69,088.205. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum 
R&D/SALES 0.283 0.000 0.000 8.286 
Ln_R&D 0.703 0.000 0.000 10.696 
EDUCATION-CEO 1.457 1.500 0.000 3.000 
ACCERTIFIED-CEO 0.011 0.000 0.000 1.000 
EDUCATION-CFO 1.370 1.000 0.000 3.000 
ACCERTIFIED-CFO 0.071 0.000 0.000 1.000 
GENDER-CEO 0.902 1.000 0.000 1.000 
GENDER-CFO 0.766 1.000 0.000 1.000 
BOARDSIZE 9.845 10.000 4.000 21.000 
INDEPENDENT 37.264 33.333 0.000 100.000 
INTCOM 2.927 3.000 0.000 7.000 
EXTCOM 1.755 2.000 0.000 5.000 
FIRMAGE 27.386 24.000 2.000 114.000 
FIRMSIZE 978,316.016 341,511.643 11,141.875 17,827,606.266 
LEVERAGE 0.504 0.507 0.054 1.193 
CURRENT 0.945 0.702 0.059 5.847 
ROA 0.047 0.036 -0.271 0.316 
OCF 0.068 0.064 -0.251 0.367 
INTANGIBLE 69,088.205 2,802.520 0.222 2,105,789.922 
Notes: This table shows descriptive statistics for the main variables used in this study. The sample includes 368 
companies listed on the IDX in 2010-2015. 
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Table 3 displays the Pearson correlations between the measures of R&D and the CEO and CFO 
variables. The correlations between R&D investment and CEO education are positive and 
significant at the 1% level. The correlations between R&D investment and CFO education are both 
positive but only one is significant at the 5% level. The correlations between R&D and CEO 
accounting certification are insignificant. However, there is a significant negative correlation 
between R&D investment and CFO accounting certification. The gender of the CFO is unrelated 
to R&D investment, but there is some evidence that male CEOs are associated with lower R&D 
investment.  
 
Table 3: Pearson Correlations 
 [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] 
[1] R&D/SALES 1.000        
         
[2] Ln_R&D 0.742*** 1.000       
 (0.000)        
[3] EDUCATION-CEO 0.194*** 0.245*** 1.000      
 (0.000) (0.000)       
[4] ACCERTIFIED-CEO -0.026 -0.037 0.007 1.000     
 (0.615) (0.483) (0.893)      
[5] GENDER-CEO -0.089* -0.042 0.034 0.035 1.000    
 (0.090) (0.419) (0.512) (0.509)     
[6] EDUCATION-CFO 0.042 0.124** 0.172*** -0.021 -0.010 1.000   
 (0.417) (0.018) (0.001) (0.693) (0.841)    
[7] ACCERTIFIED-CFO -0.069 -0.097* 0.018 0.073 0.019 -0.080 1.000  
 (0.186) (0.064) (0.724) (0.160) (0.711) (0.123)   
[8] GENDER-CFO -0.062 0.002 0.082 -0.004 0.056 0.040 0.127** 1.000 
 (0.234) (0.976) (0.118) (0.938) (0.285) (0.444) (0.015)  
Notes: This table shows the Pearson Correlation test results from 368 firms listed on the IDX 2010-2015 with *t > 
1.645, ** t > 1.960, *** t > 2.326, significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
CEO Education and R&D Investment 
 
Table 4 shows the results of model 1, relating R&D investment to the education of CEOs. We 
hypothesize a positive relationship between the education level of CEOs and R&D investment, 
and a negative relationship between accounting certification of CEOs and R&D investment. There 
are three specifications using R&D/SALES and another three using Ln_R&D as the measures of 
R&D investment. Across all specifications, the coefficients on EDUCATION-CEO are positive 
and significant at the 1% level. These results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and indicate that 
CEOs with higher educational levels invest more in research and development.  
 
The coefficients on ACCERTIFIED-CEO are negative and significant in specifications 2 and 5, 
but are insignificant in the full models (specifications 3 and 6). Thus, once the education level of 
CEOs is taken into account, there is no remaining relationship between CEO accounting 
certification and R&D investment. This indicates that Hypothesis 2 is not supported for CEOs. 
The results for the control variables indicate that R&D investment is higher in bigger firms, firms 
with lower leverage, lower current ratios and less intangible assets. There are no significant 
relationships between board governance variables and R&D investment, but there is evidence that 
male CEOs are associated with less R&D investment.  
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Table 4: CEO Education and R&D Investment 
                      R&D/SALES                                         Ln_R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EDUCATION-CEO 0.445***  0.452*** 0.917***  0.926*** 
 (4.38)  (4.44) (5.23)  (5.27) 
ACCERTIFIED-CEO  -0.421** -0.350  -0.728* -0.637 
  (-1.98) (-1.22)  (-1.93) (-1.14) 
GENDER-CEO   -1.326*   -1.824** 
   (-1.70)   (-1.99) 
BOARDSIZE -0.023 -0.026 -0.016 -0.035 -0.041 -0.025 
 (-0.73) (-0.78) (-0.49) (-0.54) (-0.60) (-0.38) 
INDEPENDENT -0.000 -0.003 0.000 0.000 -0.005 0.001 
 (-0.04) (-0.36) (0.03) (0.02) (-0.31) (0.07) 
INTCOM 0.075 0.073 0.059 0.146 0.140 0.125 
 (0.73) (0.70) (0.63) (0.65) (0.61) (0.57) 
EXTCOM 0.084 0.104 0.044 0.089 0.133 0.033 
 (0.56) (0.75) (0.30) (0.29) (0.48) (0.11) 
FIRMAGE -0.027 0.005 0.011 -0.048 0.018 0.004 
 (-0.37) (0.06) (0.13) (-0.29) (0.10) (0.02) 
FIRMSIZE -0.042 -0.080 -0.037 0.268** 0.192 0.274** 
 (-0.82) (-1.41) (-0.71) (2.37) (1.62) (2.45) 
LEVERAGE -0.594** -0.574** -0.570** -1.145** -1.099** -1.114** 
 (-2.51) (-2.42) (-2.50) (-2.41) (-2.25) (-2.36) 
CURRENT -0.114** -0.077 -0.106** -0.117 -0.042 -0.104 
 (-2.29) (-1.62) (-2.02) (-1.27) (-0.43) (-1.11) 
ROA -0.162 -0.065 -0.289 1.232 1.430 1.061 
 (-0.26) (-0.11) (-0.48) (0.84) (0.89) (0.73) 
OCF -0.174 0.271 0.180 -0.259 0.666 0.220 
 (-0.39) (0.63) (0.33) (-0.28) (0.71) (0.22) 
INTANGIBLE -0.021 -0.000 -0.018 -0.105** -0.063 -0.101** 
 (-0.93) (-0.01) (-0.79) (-2.36) (-1.35) (-2.26) 
CONSTANT 0.818 1.404 0.644 -2.236 -1.033 -2.474 
 (0.89) (1.46) (0.69) (-1.29) (-0.59) (-1.42) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
R-squared 0.157 0.104 0.203 0.203 0.130 0.230 
N 368 368 368 368 368 368 
Notes: This table shows the results of multiple linear regressions between CEO education and R&D Investment of 
368 companies listed on the IDX 2010-2015 with  *t > 1.645, ** t > 1.960, *** t > 2.326, significance at 10%, 5% 
and 1%. 
 
CFO Education and R&D Investment 
 
Table 5 shows the results of model 2, relating R&D investment to the education of CFOs. We 
hypothesize a positive relationship between the education level of CFOs and R&D investment, 
and a negative relationship between accounting certification of CFOs and R&D investment. When 
R&D/SALES is used as the measure of R&D investment the coefficients on EDUCATION-CFO 
are insignificant. However, when Ln_R&D is the dependent variable, the coefficients on 
EDUCATION-CFO are positive and significant at the 5% level. Thus, there is partial support for 
Hypothesis 1 for CFOs.   
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Across all specifications, the coefficients on ACCERTIFIED-CFO are positive and significant. 
These results are consistent with Hypothesis 2 and indicate that CFOs with accounting 
certifications invest less in research and development. The results for the control variables are 
similar to the previous model, and indicate that R&D investment is higher in bigger firms, firms 
with lower leverage and lower current ratios. There is no relationship between CFO gender and 
R&D investment.  
 
Table 5: CFO Education and R&D Investment 
 R&D/SALES Ln_R&D 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
EDUCATION-CFO 0.114  0.100 0.416***  0.378** 
 (1.39)  (1.20) (2.65)  (2.44) 
ACCERTIFIED-CFO  -0.286** -0.221*  -0.781*** -0.619*** 
  (-2.51) (-1.85)  (-3.50) (-2.76) 
GENDER-CFO   -0.217   -0.243 
   (-1.36)   (-1.12) 
BOARDSIZE -0.027 -0.020 -0.023 -0.044 -0.025 -0.032 
 (-0.82) (-0.61) (-0.69) (-0.67) (-0.38) (-0.48) 
INDEPENDENT -0.004 -0.003 -0.005 -0.007 -0.005 -0.009 
 (-0.42) (-0.38) (-0.57) (-0.42) (-0.33) (-0.50) 
INTCOM 0.062 0.062 0.052 0.111 0.115 0.092 
 (0.59) (0.61) (0.50) (0.48) (0.51) (0.41) 
EXTCOM 0.122 0.111 0.139 0.187 0.147 0.208 
 (0.85) (0.81) (0.96) (0.66) (0.54) (0.73) 
FIRMAGE -0.001 0.013 0.015 -0.004 0.040 0.026 
 (-0.02) (0.17) (0.19) (-0.02) (0.23) (0.15) 
FIRMSIZE -0.078 -0.087 -0.085 0.195* 0.170 0.175 
 (-1.40) (-1.52) (-1.50) (1.65) (1.43) (1.49) 
LEVERAGE -0.582** -0.556** -0.561** -1.145** -1.059** -1.106** 
 (-2.51) (-2.37) (-2.40) (-2.39) (-2.16) (-2.28) 
CURRENT -0.081* -0.077 -0.070 -0.050 -0.038 -0.031 
 (-1.75) (-1.63) (-1.49) (-0.52) (-0.38) (-0.31) 
ROA -0.080 -0.146 -0.079 1.389 1.217 1.296 
 (-0.13) (-0.23) (-0.13) (0.86) (0.75) (0.78) 
OCF 0.211 0.361 0.330 0.400 0.889 0.637 
 (0.47) (0.82) (0.71) (0.43) (0.94) (0.67) 
INTANGIBLE -0.002 0.003 0.006 -0.068 -0.053 -0.053 
 (-0.09) (0.13) (0.27) (-1.49) (-1.15) (-1.17) 
CONSTANT 1.314 1.406 1.460 -1.351 -1.021 -1.161 
 (1.39) (1.47) (1.50) (-0.78) (-0.59) (-0.68) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
R-squared 0.106 0.106 0.114 0.143 0.138 0.152 
N 368 368 368 368 368 368 
Notes: This table shows the results of multiple linear regressions between CFO education and R&D investment of 368 companies listed on the 
IDX 2010-2015 with  *t > 1.645, ** t > 1.960, *** t > 2.326, significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
 
Robustness Checks  
 
Since CEOs and CFOs do not make decisions in isolation, we repeat our analysis including both 
the CEO and CFO variables in the same model. Table 6 presents these results. We find that the 
coefficients on EDUCATION-CEO are still positive and significant at the 1% level. The 
coefficients on ACCREDITED-CEO are insignificant. The coefficient on EDUCATION-CFO is 
only significantly positive in the second specification. In addition, the coefficient on 
ACCREDITED-CFO is only significantly negative in the second specification. These results are 
consistent with those previously reported and indicate that the education level of both CEOs and 
CFOs are positively related to R&D investment, consistent with Hypothesis 1. With respect to 
Hypothesis 2, there is also evidence that CFOs with accounting certifications are associated with 
lower R&D investment.  




To further investigate the relationship between CEO and CFO education levels and R&D 
investment, we separate the education variables into individual level indicators. CEOBACHELOR 
is a dummy variable equal to one for CEOs with a Bachelor degree. CEOMASTER is a dummy 
variable equal to one for CEOs with a Master degree. CEODOCTORAL is a dummy variable equal 
to one for CEOs with a Doctoral degree. The unidentified group is CEOs with a Diploma. We also 
construct similar variables for CFOs (CFOBACHELOR, CFOMASTER and CFODOCTORAL). 
If higher education is associated with more R&D investment, then we would expect increasingly 
higher positive coefficients on the Bachelor, Master and Doctoral variables. 
 
Table 6: CEO & CFO Education and R&D Investment 
 R&D/SALES Ln_R&D 
EDUCATION-CEO 0.443*** 0.881*** 
 (4.27) (5.19) 
ACCERTIFIED-CEO -0.335 -0.546 
 (-1.09) (-0.83) 
EDUCATION-CFO 0.058 0.286** 
 (0.73) (1.99) 
ACCERTIFIED-CFO -0.182 -0.542** 
 (-1.36) (-2.19) 
GENDER-CEO -1.302 -1.829* 
 (-1.64) (-1.96) 
GENDER-CFO -0.186 -0.210 
 (-1.14) (-0.97) 
BOARDSIZE -0.013 -0.017 
 (-0.40) (-0.27) 
INDEPENDENT -0.001 -0.002 
 (-0.14) (-0.10) 
INTCOM 0.047 0.091 
 (0.50) (0.41) 
EXTCOM 0.069 0.089 
 (0.44) (0.29) 
FIRMAGE 0.021 0.017 
 (0.24) (0.10) 
FIRMSIZE -0.044 0.253** 
 (-0.83) (2.26) 
LEVERAGE -0.562** -1.121** 
 (-2.44) (-2.35) 
CURRENT -0.095* -0.085 
 (-1.81) (-0.85) 
ROA -0.287 0.963 
 (-0.47) (0.64) 
OCF 0.232 0.246 
 (0.42) (0.25) 
INTANGIBLE -0.012 -0.089** 
 (-0.55) (-2.02) 
CONSTANT 0.731 -2.489 
 (0.75) (-1.43) 
Year Dummies Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included 
R-squared 0.210 0.245 
N 368 368 
Notes: This table shows the results of multiple linear regressions between CEO & CFO education and R&D investment of 368 
companies listed on the IDX 2010-2015 with  *t > 1.645, ** t > 1.960, *** t > 2.326, significance at 10%, 5% and 1%. 
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Table 7 presents the results of this analysis. We find that the coefficients on CEOBACHELOR, 
CEOMASTER and CEODOCTORAL are increasingly positive and significant. This is consistent 
with our expectations and indicates that the higher the education level of CEOs the greater the 
positive effect on R&D investment. For CFOs we find that the positive relationship between CFO 
education and R&D investment is only significant when CFOs have a Master degree. R&D 
investment is also still lower when CFOs have accounting certifications. Thus, the results for CFOs 
are more specific to the type of education, rather than the overall education level.  
 
Table 7: CEO & CFO Education Level and R&D Investment  
 CEO CFO ALL 
 R&D/SALES Ln_R&D R&D/SALES Ln_R&D R&D/SALES Ln_R&D 
CEOBACHELOR 0.249* 0.530**   0.269* 0.627** 
 (1.65) (2.10)   (1.68) (2.48) 
CEOMASTER 0.709*** 1.369***   0.725*** 1.396*** 
 (3.49) (4.67)   (3.46) (4.73) 
CEODOCTORAL 1.628*** 4.030***   1.596*** 3.885*** 
 (3.79) (3.19)   (3.52) (3.08) 
ACCERTIFIED-CEO -0.321 -0.582   -0.351 -0.530 
 (-1.13) (-1.12)   (-1.18) (-0.85) 
CFOBACHELOR   0.161 0.021 0.237 0.120 
   (1.28) (0.08) (1.49) (0.42) 
CFOMASTER   0.298** 0.582** 0.304** 0.532* 
   (2.23) (2.00) (2.08) (1.75) 
CFODOCTORAL   -0.116 0.083 -0.339 -0.316 
   (-0.73) (0.16) (-1.29) (-0.51) 
ACCERTIFIED-CFO   -0.221* -0.607*** -0.166 -0.493** 
   (-1.82) (-2.75) (-1.21) (-2.10) 
GENDER-CEO -1.332* -1.871**   -1.348* -1.925** 
 (-1.69) (-2.02)   (-1.68) (-2.02) 
GENDER-CFO   -0.230 -0.265 -0.205 -0.230 
   (-1.42) (-1.21) (-1.21) (-1.04) 
BOARDSIZE -0.010 -0.010 -0.024 -0.035 -0.011 -0.010 
 (-0.32) (-0.16) (-0.73) (-0.52) (-0.33) (-0.15) 
INDEPENDENT 0.001 0.004 -0.005 -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.14) (0.20) (-0.62) (-0.59) (-0.10) (-0.07) 
INTCOM 0.052 0.112 0.048 0.087 0.035 0.076 
 (0.56) (0.54) (0.46) (0.38) (0.38) (0.36) 
EXTCOM 0.015 -0.045 0.147 0.221 0.049 0.038 
 (0.10) (-0.14) (1.00) (0.77) (0.31) (0.12) 
FIRMAGE 0.021 0.047 0.028 0.042 0.051 0.083 
 (0.26) (0.27) (0.35) (0.23) (0.59) (0.46) 
FIRMSIZE -0.042 0.246** -0.088 0.170 -0.052 0.220* 
 (-0.86) (2.17) (-1.54) (1.44) (-1.04) (1.93) 
LEVERAGE -0.552** -1.088** -0.606** -1.148** -0.615** -1.184** 
 (-2.42) (-2.30) (-2.54) (-2.33) (-2.59) (-2.45) 
CURRENT -0.102* -0.082 -0.057 -0.022 -0.072 -0.044 
 (-1.86) (-0.85) (-1.24) (-0.21) (-1.41) (-0.44) 
ROA -0.273 1.215 -0.042 1.269 -0.201 1.164 
 (-0.44) (0.84) (-0.07) (0.75) (-0.32) (0.77) 
OCF 0.227 0.296 0.310 0.597 0.256 0.254 
 (0.43) (0.30) (0.66) (0.63) (0.47) (0.26) 
INTANGIBLE -0.018 -0.095** 0.005 -0.054 -0.013 -0.084* 
 (-0.77) (-2.08) (0.24) (-1.17) (-0.58) (-1.85) 
CONSTANT 0.807 -2.052 1.439 -0.774 0.745 -1.947 
 (0.84) (-1.24) (1.47) (-0.45) (0.73) (-1.15) 
Year Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Industry Dummies Included Included Included Included Included Included 
R-squared 0.208 0.247 0.117 0.157 0.220 0.264 
N 368 368 368 368 368 368 
Notes: This table shows the results of multiple linear regressions between CEO & CFO education level and R&D investment of 368 companies 
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Discussion of the Results 
 
The analysis in this paper highlights two consistent results. The first is a positive relationship 
between CEO education levels and R&D investment. The second is a negative relationship 
between CFO accounting certifications and R&D investment. These results are summarized in 
Table 8 and discussed in more detail below. 
 








Education level & R&D investment + +  
Accounting certification & R&D investment -  - 
 
In all specifications of our analysis, we find that higher levels of CEO education are associated 
with higher R&D investment. The results in Table 7 also indicate that the magnitude of this 
relationship increases as the level of CEO education increases. The magnitudes roughly double 
from bachelor to master levels, and again from master to doctoral levels of CEO education. These 
results are consistent with Hypothesis 1 and suggest that CEOs with higher education levels have 
stronger insights, higher cognitive abilities and a longer term perspective, which result in greater 
investment in R&D activities. 
 
The relationship between CFO accounting certification and R&D investment is also consistently 
negative across nearly all specifications. This is consistent with Hypothesis 2 and suggests that 
CFOs with accounting certifications have higher levels of risk aversion, even when performing 
responsibilities beyond financial reporting. Their preference for risk avoidance also manifests 
itself in lower R&D investment.   
 
The results for CFO education levels and R&D investment are positive and significant in some 
models, particularly for CFOs with a Master degree. However, the results for this relationship are 
not as consistent as those reported above. We also find very limited evidence that CEOs with 
accounting certifications invest less in R&D activities. The predominant result here is an 
insignificant relationship.  
 
In summary, the results of this research provide useful information to policymakers in Indonesia 
and other developing markets in their efforts to promote R&D investment and increase the 
productivity of the R&D sector. Firms with more highly educated CEOs invest more in R&D 
activities. Firms also need to be wary of the risk-adverse nature of CFOs with accounting 




This study investigates whether research and development investments by listed firms in Indonesia 
are related to the educational backgrounds of their CEOs and CFOs. We find that CEOs with higher 
educational levels invest more in research and development. This is consistent with more education 
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instilling a longer-term perspective on corporate managers, resulting in greater investment in 
R&D. We also find that CFOs with accounting certifications invest less in R&D, consistent with 
the conservative nature of the accounting profession.     
 
Contributions of the Study 
 
This study contributes to the existing literature on R&D investment in a number of ways. This 
paper is the first to focus on how the characteristics of both CEOs and CFOs influence firm-level 
R&D activities. In addition, prior studies have focused on the relationship between R&D activities 
and the technical backgrounds of executives from the perspective of science and innovation 
experience. This research investigates the relationship between accounting certifications and R&D 
activities, as we believe the accounting profession promotes risk aversion, which is expected to be 
associated with less investment in risky R&D activities. Finally, the majority of prior literature 
examines R&D issues in developed markets. There is limited research on R&D activities in 
developing markets, such as Indonesia. This study therefore adds to the investigation of factors 
related to R&D investment in developing markets, where R&D investment is of increasing 
importance.  
 
Implications of the Study 
 
For companies and shareholders, our findings indicate the need for a greater understanding of the 
factors associated with firm’s R&D investments. Particularly, factors related to the education and 
experience of CEOs and other executives, whose characteristics can have a real impact on the 
R&D investment decisions of firms. In this study, we show that different education backgrounds 
create a bias for or against R&D investment in Indonesian firms. We find that more highly 
educated CEOs spend more on R&D investment. Thus, firms looking to increase their R&D 
investment should be looking to hire or retain a CEO with a higher education level (Master or 
Doctorate).  
 
We also find a negative relationship between R&D investment and CFOs with accounting 
certifications. We attribute this to the conservative and risk averse nature of the accounting 
profession. Thus, firms looking to increase their R&D investment need to be wary of the risk 
averse nature of some of their top executives and devise a strategy to ensure it does not overly 
influence their R&D activities.  
 
Limitations and Future Research 
 
Since Indonesia has a growing focus on boosting its research and development capabilities, it is 
important for researchers to continue to examine factors related to R&D investment and successful 
R&D outcomes. This research can provide useful information to policymakers in Indonesia and 
other developing markets in their efforts to promote R&D investment and increase the productivity 
of the R&D sector. This study examines a limited number of characteristics of two members of 
the top management team. More work is needed to study other relevant characteristics and to 
investigate the effect of all parties involved in R&D investment decisions.  
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Appendix: Variable Definitions 





R&D expense divided by total sales 























Education variable, 0 for CEOs who have Diploma, 1 for CEOs 
who have a Bachelor degree, 2 for CEOs who have a Master 
degree, and 3 for CEOs who have a Doctoral degree 
Dummy variable, 1 for CEOs who have an accounting 
certification (e.g. CPA) 
Dummy variable, 1 for CEOs who have a bachelor degree  
Dummy variable, 1 for CEOs who have a master degree  
Dummy variable, 1 for CEOs who have a doctoral degree  
Education variable, 0 for CFOs who have a Diploma, 1 for 
CFOs who have a Bachelor degree, 2 for CFOs who have a 
Master degree, and 3 for CFOs who have a Doctoral degree 
Dummy variable, 1 for CFOs who have an accounting 
certification (e.g. CPA) 
Dummy variable, 1 for CFOs who have a bachelor degree 
Dummy variable, 1 for CFOs who have a master degree 





































Dummy variable, 1 for male CEOs and 0 for female CEOs  
Dummy variable, 1 for male CFOs and 0 for female CFOs  
Natural logarithm of the number of members of the board of 
directors and board of commissioners in the company 
Percentage of the number of independent commissioners in the 
company 
Number of internal commissioners in the company 
Number of external commissioners in the company 
Natural logarithm of the number of years since the company was 
founded 
Natural logarithm of total assets 
Total debt divided by total assets 
Current assets divided by current liabilities 
Net income divided by total assets 
Net cash flows from operating activities divided by total assets 
Natural logarithm of intangible assets 
 
Annual Report 
Annual Report 
Annual Report 
 
Annual Report 
 
Annual Report 
Annual Report 
ORBIS 
 
ORBIS 
ORBIS 
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